Showing posts with label Trade Secrets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trade Secrets. Show all posts

Friday, December 16, 2011

Samsung Dreaming of a Green Christmas: Court Denies Apple's Request For Injunction

Apple's iPhone 4
Samsung's Infuse 4G
'Tis the season to attempt to enjoin one's competitors from offering their products in the U.S. market. Several years ago it was the Razor scooter company that sought injunctions against 13 competitors selling scooter products in the busy holiday shopping season.  This year, Apple and Samsung are in the mix as they vie for position in the cell phone and tablet market. However, unlike Razor, which obtained more than a dozen injunctions during the holiday shopping season in 2000, this year Apple's effort was not so successful.

In April, Apple, Inc. filed a Federal lawsuit in California against the Korean electronics company Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and its U.S. affiliates, asserting claims of trademark infringement, patent infringement and related claims and alleging that Samsung "slavishly copied" its iPad and iPod Touch designs, including Apple's technology, distinctive user interfaces and distinctive product and packaging design, in Samsung's Galaxy line of mobile phones and its Galaxy Tab computer tablet.

Apple subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Earlier this month, District Judge Lucy Koh denied the motion. In a 65-page order, the Court ruled that Apple is not entitled to enjoin Samsung from offering such products as its Galaxy S 4G, Infuse 4G and Tablet 10.1 before there is a full trial on the merits.

The Court found the Samsung Galaxy S 4G phone has an overall design that an ordinary observer would likely find substantially the same as one Apple design patent, and that the Infuse 4 phone likely infringes another.  The Court was not persuaded by Samsung's arguments that various Apple design patents are invalid based on the functionality doctrine. Under the functionality doctrine, an article of manufacture is functional, and hence not protectable by a design patent, if the appearance of the product's design is dictated by its use or purpose. Apple established that it had considered and discarded alternative designs and convinced the court that alternative designs were available, with different characteristics that were neither more nor less utilitarian than the design of Apple's products, thus weakening the argument that the products' designs were functional.  However, Apple failed to establish that it would suffer irreparable harm, so it was not entitled to an injunction.

As for the Galaxy Tab 10.1, while the Court also found Apple was likely to establish at trial that Samsung's tablet is substantially similar to Apple's patent.  For this product, it made a much stronger case that it would suffer irreparable harm.  But Apple had not established it was likely to succeed on the merits at trial because it was not likely to overcome Samsung's defense that there was significant prior art that could invalidate the patent at issue. Based on the strength of prior art presented by Samsung Apple, the Court denied the injunction as to the Samsung tablet.

In short, the Court declined to issue an injunction for any of the Samsung products at issue.  Given its one-sided victory (at least in this particular battle), one suspects that Samsung would have been tempted to immediately strike the harp and join the chorus.  However, almost as soon as the Court denied Apple's request for an injunction, Judge Koh's staff realized that an unredacted version of the Court's order had been posted online. Judge Koh had not intended to include certain sensitive and confidential information that the parties had disclosed in the case, but inadvertently neglected to black-out certain portions of the order. Reuters obtained the unredacted copy before the error was corrected by the Court. According to Reuters, an "internal company analysis concerning the smartphone market," and "details concerning Apple's patent licensing relationships with other tech companies" were briefly made available to the general public.  Which side was more affected by the inadvertent disclosure is anybody's guess; the parties have declined to comment. 

But Samsung's victory is no secret.  One can practically envision Samsung executives caroling in the hallways now that the company appears positioned to disrupt iPad and iPhone sales and Apple's holiday profits.   

Fa la la la la, la la la la....

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

Order Compelling Disclosure of Trade Secrets Vacated By Appellate Court

A California appellate court has taken the unusual step of issuing a peremptory writ of mandate, directing a lower court to vacate a discovery order that had compelled a party in civil litigation to disclose its trade secrets to its opponent.

In 2007, Sybase, Inc. (Sybase) and ANTs Software Inc. (ANTs) signed a nondisclosure agreement to facilitate their negotiations for a new product that was code named “Pegasus.” In 2008, the parties entered into a licensing agreement with ANTs for ANTs Data Server (ADS) software with respect to Pegasus. Sybase is a data management software developer, and Pegasus was to be a product for Sybase's flagship database product, ASE. Following their negotiations, in 2008, they entered into the license agreement. Sybase would later sue ANTs alleging violations of the licensing and nondisclosure agreements.

Sybase's complaint alleges that, at the time ANTs was negotiating with Sybase, its vice-president was also negotiating with Sybase's competitor, Four J’s Development Tools, Inc. (Four J’s), for the sale of ADS, and passed confidential information about the negotiation with Sybase to Four J's. During their negotiations, an ANT vice president who participated in the negotiations went to work for Four J's, and a week after Sybase and ANTs signed the license agreement, ANTs emailed Four J's a copy of the agreement, which disclosed the names of four key ANTs employees that Sybase was supposed to hire. ANTs and Four J’s then entered into an asset purchase agreement for ADS, but ANTs did not assign the license agreement to Four J’s. Four J’s then solicited two of the key employees, who resigned from Sybase and began working for Four J’s.

Sybase sued ANTs, asserting several causes of action in connection with for alleged violations of this licensing agreement and a related nondisclosure agreement.  Its allegations included that ANTs’ source code was defective when it was delivered and that it could not be successfully integrated into Sybase’s source code, in violation of the agreement.

During discovery, ANTs requested documents from Sybase including "all source code for" a related product. Sybase objected. In the ensuing discovery dispute, Sybase added its source code to a log of materials it asserted were privileged against disclosure because, it contended, it was Sybase's trade secret. ANT conceded the source code met the test for a trade secret, but maintained it nevertheless was entitled to obtain it because it was necessary to defend against Sybase's claims. Sybase countered that there were "other, better ways" for ANTS to obtain the information it asserted was necessary.

Because Sybase was claiming that ANTs’ source code was defective and could not successfully be integrated into Sybase’s source code, the trial court agreed that Sybase's source code and related documents were directly relevant to ANTs’s defense and that ANTs would be unfairly disadvantaged in defending the case without its disclosure.  The lower court therefore ordered Sybase to disclose its source code and other materials.  Sybase promptly filed a writ with the appellate court.

California Evidence Code § 1060 provides that the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose a secret if maintaining the privilege "will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice." The lower court found that ANTs made the appropriate showing required for ordering the disclosure of trade secrets as required under the case Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384 (Bridgestone). However, the Court of Appeal disagreed:
Bridgestone sets forth the standard for determining whether a trade secret must be disclosed in litigation: Once a party claiming the trade secret privilege has shown that it applies, the party seeking discovery must make “a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. It is then up to the holder of the privilege to demonstrate any claimed disadvantages of a protective order. Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure.
The appellate court held that ANT had failed to show the actual source code was necessary to its defense and a fair resolution of the proceedings because other avenues appeared to be available for obtaining the relevant information short of requiring disclosure of the actual code, for example, by taking the deposition of relevant individuals.  The court also found that the certain of ANTs' arguments were not supported by the evidence, and refused to consider other arguments that had not been raised with the trial court.  However, given that additional documents had been ordered disclosed discovery on the issue was not yet complete, the Court of Appeal left the door open and explained that, if additional evidence is discovered by which the Bridgestone standard may be satisfied, ANTs could renew its motion.

The case, Sybase v. Superior Court, Case No. A132541 (2011), is available here.

Thursday, April 21, 2011

Jury Awards MGA $88 Million in Barbie-Bratz Dispute

In the latest round in the six-year old rock'em-sock'em intellectual property bout between the makers of Barbie and Bratz dolls, a federal jury has awarded MGA Entertainment damages of more than $88 million for misappropriation of trade secrets, while rejecting Mattel, Inc.'s claims against MGA for copyright infringement.

The dispute involves competing claims of intellectual property violations arising out of the design of the Bratz doll for MGA by Carter Bryant, a one-time Mattel employee who designed fashions and hair styles for its Barbie doll. In 2000, while still at Mattel, Bryant pitched his idea for the Bratz line of dolls to two MGA employees. The pitch was successful and, on October 4, 2000, Bryant gave Mattel two-week notice and signed a consulting agreement with MGA. Bryant contended that he worked on the idea on nights, weekends and when he was otherwise off-the-clock. The Bratz line proved very successful for MGA.

Mattel filed suit against MGA for copyright infringement and related claims. MGA responded with a counterclaim against Mattel for misappropriation of trade secrets byway of corporate espionage. MGA alleged that Mattel had operated a “market intelligence” department for more than a decade, that its employees had printed fake business cards to gain access to competitors' private showrooms, and that Mattel misappropriated confidential information about competitors' toys that were not yet on the market, including their appearance, operation, intended play patterns, price lists, and advertising plans and strategies.

The eight-person jury unanimously rejected Mattel's claims for copyright infringement and found that Mattel did not own the rights to either the Bratz dolls or their early models or sketches. The jury also found that MGA did not misappropriate Mattel's trade secrets.

The jury awarded damages on 26 of the 114 trade secrets MGA had accused Mattel of misappropriating. MGA may still recover its attorneys fees and an award of punitive damages based on the jury's finding that Mattel's conduct was willful and malicious.

In a hollow victory for Mattel, the jury also found that MGA had intentionally interfered with its contractual relations with Carter Bryant. Mattel was awarded $10,000 for those claims. The Barbie maker is expected to appeal.

The case is Bryant v. Mattel, 04-09049, U.S. District Court, Central District of California.

Monday, October 25, 2010

Bratz-Barbie Doll Copyright and Trademark Dispute Continues: Ninth Circuit Denies Mattel's Petition For Rehearing

The Bratz – Barbie doll battle continues in a dispute between their respective owners, MGA Entertainment, Inc. and Mattel, Inc. On October 21, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Mattel's petition for rehearing of its decision of last Summer.

The effect is that the Ninth Circuit's earlier ruling in favor of MGA will essentially remain intact and Mattel will have to prove its case at trial rather. (The ruling denied Mattel's petition to have the case reheard by the Ninth Circuit's three judge panel that heard the case originally or by a larger panel of the Court.)

The case involves copyright and trademark issues arising out of the design of the Bratz doll for MGA by Carter Bryant, a one-time Mattel employee who designed fashions and hair styles for its Barbie doll. In 2000, while still at Mattel, Bryant pitched his idea for the Bratz line of dolls to two MGA employees. The pitch was successful and on October 4, 2000, Bryant gave Mattel two-week notice and signed a consulting agreement with MGA. Bryant contended that he worked on the idea on nights, weekends and when he was otherwise off-the-clock. The Bratz line proved very successful for MGA.

Multiple lawsuits ensued, which were consolidated and divided into two phases. Phase 1 involved claims related to Bratz' ownership, including copyright and trademark claims. This case concerned an interlocutory appeal of the equitable orders entered at the conclusion of that phase. (Phase 2 remains pending.)

In Phase I, Mattel prevailed in the trial court on virtually every point. The jury had found that Bryant thought of the “Bratz” and “Jade” names and that he had created the preliminary sketches and sculpt while he was still employed by Mattel. It also found that MGA committed three violations of state-law relating to his involvement with Bratz. It issued a general verdict that found MGA liable for infringing Mattel’s copyrights in Bryant’s preliminary Bratz works.

Although Mattel sought more than $1 billion in copyright damages, the jury awarded it only about 1% of that amount ($10 million), perhaps because it found only a small portion of the Bratz dolls were infringing. The district court then entered equitable relief based on the jury’s findings. In July 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled in MGA's favor.

With respect to the trademark claims, the trial court had imposed a constructive trust over all trademarks, and essentially transferred MGA's entire Bratz trademark portfolio to Mattel. As for the copyright claims, the court issued an injunction prohibiting MGA from producing or marketing virtually every Bratz female fashion doll.

Some issues concerned an employment agreement Bryant had signed with Mattel, which assigned inventions created during his employment with the company to Mattel. However, Bryant's job did not include creating new doll lines. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court and found that the contract was ambiguous as to whether it resulted in an assignment of everything Bryant invented during his working hours, or everything he invented during the entire calendar period of his employment with Mattel - even if what he invented was outside the scope of his employment. Thus, the trial court should have submitted to the jury the issue of whether or not his work on nights and weekends on the Bratz line fell within the scope of the contract.

The Ninth Circuit also vacated the trial court's copyright injunction. It addressed the copyright analysis and explained the parameters the trial court should have considered in evaluating the protectable and unprotectable elements of the designs, and the differences between the copyrightable expression of ideas and the noncopyrightable ideas themselves.

The Ninth Circuit also reversed the trial court's trademark rulings. The issue of whether Bryant's employment agreement with Mattel covered Bryant's ideas for the "Bratz" and "Jade" names, which were part of the trademark portfolio, the Ninth Circuit found it was error to hold that Bryant's employment agreement "unambiguously" covered those ideas and that it necessarily assigned them to Mattel. The trial court further abused its discretion in transferring the entire Bratz trademark portfolio to Mattel the Ninth Circuit found these issues should have been decided by a jury at trial. Thus, the Ninth Circuit also vacated the constructive trust and other equitable relief concerning Mattel's rights to the Bratz trademarks.

The court warned that a narrower constructive trust could only be imposed if there was a proper determination that Mattel owned Bryant's ideas; and that it could only issue a copyright injunction if the Bratz "sculpts," which were used in manufacturing the Bratz dolls, were "virtually identical" to a preliminary sculpt that Bryant created before he left Mattel. The court also suggested that most, if not all, of the case that was tried to a jury might need to be retried in light of its opinion.

As a result of the Ninth Circuit's ruling last week, its July 2010 ruling stands (other than a few changes in which the court amended four lines of the prior 25 page opinion). The case will be returned to the trial court for a jury trial.

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in MGA Entertainment, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 9th Cir. Case. No. 09-55673 (Oct. 21, 2010) is available here.

Friday, October 22, 2010

The End Is Near For The Trade Secret Exception to California's Bar Against Non-Compete Agreements

The death watch continues for California's common law "trade secrets exception" to the prohibition against non-competition agreements, after another appellate court questioned its viability earlier this week.

Covenants not to compete are generally void in California, subject to only a few exceptions. The state has long recognized a "strong public policy" in favor of employees' interests in their own "mobility and betterment" and these interests are recognized as being paramount to the competitive business interests of employers. Thus, courts have consistently declared that every citizen has the right to pursue any lawful employment and enterprise of his or her choice. This principal has been codified in Business and Professions Code section 16600, which provides:

every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.

That section, or some version of it, has been California law since 1872.

On the other hand, a long line of cases in California has also held that former employees may not misappropriate their former employers' trade secrets to unfairly compete with them. (Confidential information that falls within the ambit of the exception is generally information that is valuable because it is unknown to others and which the owner has taken reasonable attempts to keep secret.) Thus, non-compete agreements have been enforced in California under common law in the context of protecting former employers' trade secrets. This is known as the "trade secrets exception" to section 16600.

In 2008, however, the California Supreme Court held that section 16600 "prohibits employee noncompetition agreements unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception." Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937 (emphasis added). This has led some to argue that, because it is not a statutory exception, the common law trade secrets exception no longer exists. This in turn has led to a rift between state and federal courts' approaches to the subject.

In the year following Edwards, two federal courts nevertheless found signs of life in the exception. In Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 2008 WL 4138181 (2008), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that, "[u]nder California law, non-competition agreements are unenforceable unless necessary to protect an employer's trade secret."). Then, in Bank of America, N.A. v. Lee, 2008 WL 4351348 (C.D. Cal., 2008), a federal district court "conclude[d] that 'trade secret exception' to § 16600 still applies."

The state courts struck back the following year. In 2009, in Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal.App.4th 564 (2009), a California appellate court openly expressed its "doubt [as to] the continued viability of the common law trade secret exception to covenants not to compete...." And this week, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal again questioned the viability of the "so-called 'trade secrets' exception" and explained that it "rests on shaky ground" under California law.

In anticipation of the approaching end of the exception, in lieu of flowers, some employers are expected to be making donations to their lobbyists in Sacramento in the hopes of codifying it.

In the meantime, we will continue to monitor the vital signs of the exception in this space.

This week's unpublished opinion in Robinson v. U-Haul C. of California, is available here.

Friday, September 24, 2010

Judge Rejects Trade Secret Claim; Orders CalPERS to Release Records Detailing $100 Million Real Estate Investment Loss

A San Francisco Superior Court judge has ordered the California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS") to release records concerning a real estate investment in which it lost $100 million, in a case brought by the First Amendment Coalition, a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to advancing openness in government.

The retirement had fund claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act, inter alia, because they constituted trade secrets. However, the Court found that CalPERS, a public agency, had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the records in question were exempt. Although CalPERS had claimed the documents were exempt, it offered only conclusory evidence to support its position, which did not address any of the particular documents being withheld.

The Court found that "[a]ssurances of confidentiality cannot convert public records into private records," and that, even if there were any trade secrets involved, a balancing of interests would have been required. In this case, the entirety of a $100 million investment had been lost by the public agency. On balance, the Court held, the interest in disclosure "far outweighs" any asserted interest in non-disclosure.

The case is First Amendment Coalition v. California Public Employees' Retirement System, San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CPF-10-510552.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Company's Attempt to Honor Prior Employer's Non-Compete Agreement May Render It Liable For Wrongful Termination

Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code renders "void" contracts that restrain people from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business (with only limited exceptions). That is, California legislative policy favors open competition and employee mobility.

On July 30, a California appellate court reaffirmed this policy in an opinion that has serious implications for whether employers that learn of new employees non-competition agreements with their prior employers can terminate the employees.

According to the complaint in the case, Rosemary Silguero began working for Floor Seal Technology, Inc. (FST as an in-house sales rep where she placed telephone orders for FST's products. In August 2007, FST required her to sign a confidentiality agreement that included non-competition provisions prohibiting her from "all sales activities for 18 months following either departure or termination." She was threatened with termination if she did not sign.

She left the company in October of that year and subsequently found a position with Creteguard, Inc. (which apparently was in the same industry). FST learned of her new position and contacted Creteguard. FST requested Creteguard's "cooperation and participation in enforcing" the non-competition agreement. Creteguard's CEO, Thomas Nucum, terminated her, in writing.

Nucum advised Silguero that he was aware of the non-compete agreement she signed. He acknowledged that he did not belive non-compete clauses are legally enforceable in California, but that Creteguard nevertheless "would like to keep the same respect and understanding with colleagues in the same industry." Silguero's termination took effect immediately.

Silguero sued Creteguard, Nucum and others (collectively "Creteguard"), alleging that (1) she had been wrongfully terminated, and (2) the conduct constituted an illegal trade restriction in violation of the Cartwright Act, a California law that prohibits agreements that restrain trade.

Creteguard demurred to the complaint, arguing that the case should be dismissed and that there is no clearly delineated public policy prohibiting subsequent employers from honoring "putatively valid" noncompetition agreements with prior employers. The trial court sustained the demurrer, essentially dismissing the case, without leave to amend. The court found Creteguard to be a prevailing party and awarded it $23,532 in attorneys fees and costs.

The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the wrongful termination claim, but not the Cartwright Act claim. The court first reiterated the principle articulated by the California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167: "although employers have the power to terminate employees at will, they may not terminate an employee for a reason that is contrary to public policy."

The Court went on to explaine why Section 16600 constitutes a clear legislative declaration of policy forbidding the sort of termination that occurred in this case. Thus, although Silguero's allegations did not support her Cartwright Act claim, Silguero will be permitted to pursue her wrongful termination claim against Creteguard.

The case, Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., California Court of Appeal Case No. B215179 (2nd District, July 30, 2010), is available here.
  • NOTE: In my post last week about an executive with the company that manufactures and distributes Thomas' English Muffins, I discussed a federal court of appeals opinion that upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting the executive from going to work for a competitor. In that post, I pointed out that the executive is California citizen who resides in California, and that the new employer hired him to work in Texas. In that case, the executive did not have a non-compete agreement but had agreed to maintain the company's trade secrets confidentially. The case was filed in Pennsylvania under Pennsylvania law. The Silguero case addressed in today's post reaffirms the strength of California public policy in favor of employee mobility, and reinforces the suggestion that this was one of the reasons the English muffin manufacturer insisted on sued in Pennsylvania rather than in California.

Monday, August 2, 2010

Much Ado About Muffins

A senior executive with knowledge of the trade secrets behind Thomas' English Muffins unique "nooks and crannies" texture may not work for the company's competitor, Hostess Brands, Inc. This according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which, on July 27, upheld a preliminary injunction issued earlier this year against the former executive.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. and its affiliates manufacturer and distribute many popular baked goods including Thomas' English Muffins. Chris Botticella, a California citizen and resident, was Bimbo's Vice President of Operations for California from 2001 until early 2010. In that capacity he was one of only seven people who possessed all of the knowledge necessary to independently replicate the muffins.

The secret process for making Thomas' English Muffins consists of three component parts, including (1) the formula, (2) the manufacturing engineering design, and (3) certain process parameters. Information about each component is kept separate from information about the other components. Access to each is restricted and provided to employees only on a "need to know" basis. For additional security, the process parameters in the third category differ between plants so that the parameters used in one plant do not work in another plant.) In his position, Botticella had access to this process and to many other company trade secrets for other products. He also knew other confidential information, such as Bimbo's national strategy for sales initiatives and product launches for major customers, such as Walmart, Costco, BJ's, and Sam's Club.

In 2009, he signed a confidentiality agreement in which he agreed not to compete directly with Bimbo during the term of his employment, nor to use or disclose any of the company's confidential or proprietary information during or after his employment. He also agreed to return every document he received from the company during his employment upon the termination of his employment. The agreement did not, however, restrict where Botticella could work after he left the company.

On September 28, 2009, Hostess, one of Bimbo’s primary competitors in the baking industry, offered Botticella a job in Texas as Vice President of Bakery Operations for its eastern region. Botticella accepted the position and agreed to begin in January 2010.

But Botticella did not disclose his plans to Bimbo for several months and continued to work at the company, and retained full access to its confidential and proprietary information, during this period. He maintained his access to confidential information during this period. For example, he met with Bimbo's president and other corpoate officers and discussed the company’s strategic plan for California. At another point Botticella deleted a number of documents from his company-issued laptop computer, including his resume and a number of documents containing confidential information. He claimed he deleted these documents because he didn’t think they would have any value to anyone. However, he later asked a computer technician to restore them, "just in case."

On January 4, 2010, he informed his supervisor at Bimbo that he planned to leave the company on January 15. He did not disclose that he was headed to Hostess, nor does it appear that Bimbo asked about his future plans. On January 12, Hostess announced the retirement of its former Vice President of Bakery Operations for the eastern region and that Botticella would replace him. Bimbo learned of the announcement and realized it didn't know its muffin man. Botticella was confronted the next day at which point he confirmed his intention to work for Hostess. He was directed to vacate Bimbo's offices that day.

Bimbo hired a computer forensics expert to test Botticella’s company laptop and his use of it during the relevant period. The testing revealed, among other things, that highly sensitive documents were accessed during Botticella's final days with the company. Moreover, a user had logged in as Botticella and accessed multiple confidential documents on January 13, minutes after Botticella was told to leave the company.

The lawsuit was filed in federal district court in Pennsylvania. On February 12, 2010, the district court entered a preliminary injunction, pending full trial on the merits, enjoining Botticella from working for Hostess, and on July 27, following an expedited appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that Bimbo was likely to prevail on the merits of its case under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act. It found the evidence supported a finding that Bimbo would succeed on the merits in proving at trial that: the relevant information constituted trade secrets; Botticella had access to the trade secrets and he was likely to misappropriate them if he went to work for Hostess; absent the injunction Bimbo would suffer irreparable harm that was greater than any harm Botticella might face; and the public interest favored the issuance of the injunction.

The appellate court's opinion also clarified the applicability of Pennsylvania's inevitable disclosures doctrine and explained that an injunction may issue even if the disclosure of trade secrets is not found to be "inevitable." That is, if a trial court finds that there is a "sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat" that the defendant will make the disclosure, it is proper to issue an injunction. Because the standards were satisfied, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

COMMENT: Botticella is California citizen residing in California, and Hostess had hired him to work in Texas. Bimbo itself is a Delaware corporation. So what procedural and choice of law nooks and crannies led the case to be litigated in Philadelphia by a court applying Pennsylvania law?

First of all, California law generally prohibits covenants not to compete, and California public policy strongly favors employee mobility. California courts have also rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine and adopted the California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act which makes it more difficult to obtain an injunction. See e.g., California Civil Code § 3426.2(a) (the mere possession of trade secrets by a departing employee is insufficient to obtain an injunction; there must be an “[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation”).

Although the facts of this case might even satisfy California's standards, the fact that the confidentiality agreement did not restrict where Botticella could work after he left the company -- and the fact that Hostess had required Botticella to execute an “Acknowledgment and Representation Form,” confirming that Hostess was not interested in any confidential information, trade secrets, or other proprietary information he may have acquired from Bimbo, and agreeing that he would not disclose such information to Hostess -- might have made it more difficult for Bimbo to prevail in California. So it is no surprise that the company elected to sue in Pennsylvania, where it alleged it maintains its "principal place of business." (The confidentiality agreement Botticella signed contained a choice of law provision that permitted Bimbo to sue there and called for the application of Pennsylvania law.)

At any rate, Botticella did not contest that Pennsylvania law should apply. It also appears he did not contest Bimbo's allegations that Pennsylvania was where the company maintained its "principal place of business." Although the confidentiality agreement might have conceded this point, if prompted, the district court might have been willing to conduct an independent analysis of the issue to determine for itself whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case in the first place. It bears noting that eleven days after the injunction was issued, the U.S. Supreme Court, in The Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct 1181 (February 23, 2010), issued a new standard for analyzing a company's "principle place of business" in diversity of citizenship cases such as this one. (A company's “principal place of business” is no longer simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings but now constitutes the company's "nerve center," where its officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.)

The preliminary injunction is expected to remain in effect until the case goes to trial.

The Third Circuit's opinion in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit Case No. 10-1510 (3d Cir., July 27, 2010) is available here.

Monday, July 19, 2010

TIG Awarded $10.8 Million Verdict in Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Case

Last week, a San Francisco jury found FusionStorm of Tampa liable for misappropriation of trade secrets and awarded the San Diego based technology company Technology Integration Group (TIG) more than $10.8 million in damages.

Three former TIG employees had been accused of misappropriating multiple trade secrets and conspiring to harm TIG’s Tampa operations. According to court documents, TIG hired one of those employees as branch manager for its Tampa, Florida office in August 2004. Two years later, he allegedly traveled to California to meet with FusionStorm's representatives. Prior to the meeting, he e-mailed TIG’s years of profit and loss statements to FusionStorm’s vice president of sales and chief executive officer from his TIG computer.

He also was alleged to have disclosed information concerning various employees from TIG's Tampa office, including their skills and salaries in order that they might be approached for employment. By the time he left TIG he was also alleged to have already obtained office space for FusionStorm.

The verdict included $9.36 Million in compensatory damages and $1.525 Million in punitive damages ($175,000 of which was personally awarded against the former TIG branch manager).

The case is PC Specialists, Inc., dba Technology Integration vs. FusionStorm, et al., San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-07-464358 (July 16, 2010).

Friday, July 16, 2010

Lost In Translation – Federal Court Issues Preliminary Injunction Against Language Interpreter For Misappropriation of Competitor's Trade Secrets

A U.S. District Court judge has issued a preliminary injunction against a language interpreter and translation company based on claims it misappropriated the trade secrets and confidential information of a competitor. The Plaintiff, Language Line Services ("Language Line") sued a competitor, Defendant Language Services Associates ("LSA"), and others for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other things.

Language Line provides language interpretation and translation services throughout the U.S. and alleges it is the largest provider of those services in the country. One of the Defendants had worked for Language Line from August 2007 to August 2008. Another had worked there from May 2008 to February 2010. Both of them had signed written confidentiality agreements. After leaving Language Line, both employees went to work for LSA.

The Complaint alleged that one of the employees went to work for LSA first, and that he and other LSA employees later successfully conspired to recruit the other employee to join LSA with the purpose of obtaining trade secrets and confidential information from Language Line. The second employee secretly took extensive amounts of Language Line's trade secrets and confidential information and gave it to LSA, including Language Line's customer list and, for each customer, valuable trade secrets and confidential information that included pricing information, actual and projected annual volumes of interpretation needs, and actual and projected revenues. In turn, the information was distributed to LSA's sales force to use in soliciting Language Line's customers.

Under the California Uniform Trade Secret Act, Cal. Civil Code § 3426 et seq. (the "Act"), a trade secret is considered information that (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Under the Act, a prima facie claim for misappropriation of a trade secret requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that:

(1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret,

(2) the defendant acquired, disclosed or used the plaintiff's trade secret through "improper means", and

(3) the defendant's actions damaged the plaintiff.

In these circumstances, the Court found that Language Line had shown a likelihood of success on the merits and otherwise satisfied the test for a preliminary injunction.

LSA argued that it could not be liable for the acts of the employees because their actions violated LSA's policies and were not known to LSA's executives. But the court dismissed that argument and found that the employees had acted within the scope of their employment, because this was the sort of act that was generally foreseeable as part of their duties to solicit customers for LSA. Language Line also submitted evidence that at least one customer has already started to give business to LSA.

The case is Language Line Services, Inc. v. Language Services Associates, LLC, U.S. District Court Case No. C 10-02605 JW (N.D.Cal., July 13, 2010).

Monday, July 12, 2010

Former Timeshare Company Employee Enjoined From Sharing Company's Trade Secrets

A Federal district court in California has issued a preliminary injunction in a case involving the alleged misappropriation a customer list. The plaintiffs in the case develop, finance, manage, market and sell timeshare properties. The defendant was a former employee who had worked for one of the plaintiffs, at various times, as a sales representative, sales manager, and director of site sales, and who was responsible for selling upgrades to existing customers.

Following the employee's termination, the president of another timeshare company contacted one of the plaintiffs to advise that a "past executive" of the plaintiff tried to sell him 40,000 names of plaintiff's timeshare owners. The employee had signed a written agreement concerning the plaintiff's confidential and proprietary information, including its client lists and client or customer contact information.

To be protectable as trade a trade secret, customer list must have economic value, which has been interpreted to mean that the secrecy of the information must provide a “substantial business advantage” to the employer. Under the California Uniform Trade Secret Act, Cal. Civil Code § 3426 et seq. a prima facie claim for misappropriation of a trade secret requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret; (2) the defendant acquired, disclosed or used the plaintiff's trade secret through "improper means", and (3) the defendant's actions damaged the plaintiff.

Courts are generally reluctant to protect customer lists that merely embody information that is readily available through public sources, such as business directories. However, a customer list may qualify for protection as a trade secret where the employer has spent time and effort identifying customers with particular needs or characteristics. In the appropriate circumstances, courts will prohibit former employees from using this information to capture a share of the market. As a rule of thumb, the more difficult information is to obtain, and the more time and resources expended by an employer in gathering it, the more likely a court will find such information to constitute a trade secret.

In this case, the court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden and were likely to succeed on the merits. Thus, the court enjoined the former employee from disclosing or using any of plaintiffs' trade secrets or proprietary or confidential information.

The case is Wyndham Resort Development Corporation v. Bingham, U.S. District Court Case No. 2:10-cv-01556-GEB-KJM (E.D.Cal. July 9, 2010).

Monday, April 26, 2010

Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Trade Secrets Case Where Statute of Limitations May Have Been Tolled

The Ninth Circuit has reversed the dismissal of a misappropriation of trade secrets case, finding that it would be premature to resolve the issue of whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations because a factual dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff's competitor concealed its misappropriation.

The court found that evidence from judicially noticeable court records existed that Plaintiff's competitor may have hidden any misappropriation by denying certain allegations at the relevant time. If that were the case, the Plaintiff would have been entitled to rely on the misrepresentations, which may have obscured the cause of action. Thus, the court concluded that it was premature to rule on the issue at the motion to dismiss stage because the plaintiff “may be able to prove a set of facts under which this action would be timely.”

The case is RA Medical Systems, Inc. v. Photomedix, Inc., Case No. No. 08-56477 (9th Cir. 2010).