Showing posts with label Motion to Dismiss. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Motion to Dismiss. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 16, 2016

Flattery Will Get You Nowhere: Federal Court Dismisses Winemaker's Insurance Coverage Action Based on Intellectual Property Exclusion

A federal Court in Northern California has dismissed an insurance coverage action based on the insurance policy's intellectual property exclusion. The Court found the insurer did not owe a duty to defend an underlying case against a winemaker for allegedly selling its wine under the name of its former president without his consent. Among the court's findings was that there was no coverage for disparagement because the company's alleged conduct did not disparage the former president. Rather, the use of his name to sell its products was more a form of flattery.

Paul Dolan is a fourth generation winemaker. In 2004, he and a family named Thornhill formed the Mendocino Wine Group (Mendocino). Dolan initially served as president and agreed to permit the company to develop wine using his name as a trademark, so long as he "was able to control the nature and quality of wine that would be sold under his name." The company then began selling wine under the Paul Dolan trademark.

According to Dolan, in 2012, he was "ousted" from the company. He then filed a lawsuit against the company, alleging claims for (1) a declaration that the company could no longer use the Paul Dolan trademark; (2) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; violation of the common law right of publicity and statutory right of publicity under California Civil Code § 3344; and cancellation of the Dolan trademark registration.

Dolan asserted that he never intended the company could use his name forever, and he revoked his consent for the company to use his name in connection with any Dolan trademark. Nevertheless, he alleged, the company continued to distribute and sell wine under the Paul Dolan trademark, and continued to use his name to market, advertise and promote its products. His lawsuit against the company claimed the continued use of the trademark violated his right of publicity and caused damage to Dolan because it directly conflicted with his own ability to use his name in connection with wine and related products and services, and because it falsely suggested the goods the company was selling and distributing were connected with him.

Mendocino tendered Dolan's claims to its insurer, Unigard Insurance Company, for coverage under a commercial general liability insurance policy. The policy stated the insurer would pay "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking damages for 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance does not apply..."

The policy also defined "personal and advertising injury" to mean "[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services" and "[o]ral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person's right of privacy."

The policy contained an intellectual property exclusion, which expressly excluded coverage for infringement of copyright, patent, trademark or trade secret, which was defined to mean "'personal and advertising injury' arising out of the infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property rights. Under this exclusion, such other intellectual property rights do not include the use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement.' 

"However, the exclusion does not apply to infringement, in your 'advertisement,' of copyright, trade dress, or slogan."

Unigard denied coverage of the claims, asserting the claims alleged in the underlying action did not give rise to coverage under the policy's insuring provisions and there was no duty for it to defend Mendocino, and also because coverage was excluded based on the intellectual property exclusion. In turn, Mendocino sued Unigard for breach of contract and bad faith. Unigard filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that Mendocino's complaint failed to state a legal claim for which relief could be granted. The Court agreed and dismissed Mendocino's lawsuit.

The Court explained that, under California law, an insurer must defend its insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity under the policy. Dolan's claims were based on his allegations that Mendocino had misappropriated his likeness without authorization. The Court found these claims did not create even a potential for coverage.

The Court explained there are two types of appropriation claims, which are distinguished by the nature of the plaintiff's right and the resulting injury. The first type - - the right of publicity - - is essentially that the public's reaction the to the individual's name and likeness, which endows them with "commercially exploitable opportunities."

The second type of appropriation brings injury to the feelings. It concerns the plaintiff's peace of mind. It is mental and subjective.

The right of publicity is considered an intellectual property right that protects a form of intellectual property which society deems to have some social utility. The "mental and subjective" type of appropriation, on the other hand, does not.

The Court found that the exclusion applied to bar coverage. While the policy covered damages for violations of privacy rights, it excluded coverage for injuries arising out of violations of intellectual property rights, such as Dolan's right of publicity claim. Dolan did not assert a claim based on injured feelings, but only that Mendocino's use of his name and likeness diminished his marketability and publicity value and deprived him of his right of publicity - - a violation of his intellectual property right, which was excluded by the plain language of the intellectual property exclusion.

Mendocino also argued that there was coverage because the allegations in Dolan's complaint alleged the elements of a defamation claim. Unigard countered that there were no allegations of the publication of defamatory material. Defamation involves a publication that is false, defamatory, and unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage, and that the publication is to a third person who understands both the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the referenced person. Similarly, disparagement concerns a false or misleading statement that specifically refers to the plaintiff's product or business and clearly derogates that product or business. Ordinarily, damage caused by defamation involves injury to a person's reputation. However, a party's attempt to copy or infringe another's intellectual property, without more, does not constitute disparagement.

Here the Court found Dolan's allegations did not allege Mendocino's misappropriation constituted a defamatory statement. Rather, Dolan contended his reputation was harmed because Mendocino's unauthorized continued sale, distribution and marketing of wine under the Paul Dolan trademark, which damaged him because it directly conflicted with his ability to use his own name in connection with wine and related products and services, and because it falsely suggested the goods Mendocino was distributing were connected with Dolan. As the court found, while these allegations supported a violation of the right of publicity, they did not support a claim for disparagement or defamation. Indeed, the Court found, Mendocino's alleged attempt to falsely sell its wine under Dolan's name is "more akin to flattery" than disparagement, and therefore did not trigger a duty to defend. (The Court's observation may find support in reports that the company subsequently settled with Dolan in a deal that permitted Mendocino to continue to sell wine under the Dolan name.)

Without a breach of the insurance contract, moreover, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law. The court therefore dismissed Mendocino's claims under Rule 12(b)(6), both for breach of contract and for bad faith.  

The case is Mendocino Wine Grp., LLC v. QBE Ams., Inc., U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California Case No. 15-cv-06342-HSG (August 5, 2016).

Friday, May 13, 2016

Star Trek Fan Film Producers Lose Effort to Dismiss Copyright Infringement Action



During its half-century voyage, the Star Trek franchise developed a planetary defense system. The defense system was designed to employ various strategies and procedures in an effort to protect fictional planets from attack.  The makers of a crowdfunded Star Trek-themed short film recently failed to effectively employ similar defenses to fend off an attack by the owners of the Star Trek franchise. Earlier this week, on May 9, U.S. District Court Judge R. Gary Klausner denied the filmmakers' motion to dismiss, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in which they argued the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted by the Federal Court.

The lawsuit was brought by Paramount Pictures and CBS Studios as the owners of the copyrights in the Star Trek franchise. They alleged in their Complaint that they owned the copyrights in the science fiction franchise, which chronicles the adventures of the U.S.S. Enterprise and its crew as they travel through space during the twenty-third century. The original television series was first broadcast nationwide in the United States in 1966 and since that time has been in syndication throughout the U.S. almost continuously.  Subsequently five additional Star Trek television series have been broadcast, totaling more than 700 episodes. There also have been a dozen Star Trek motion pictures, and the studios are continuing to develop additional works, including the planned release of an new feature film in 2016 and new television series in 2017. CBS is the owner of the copyrights in the television series and Paramount owns the copyrights in the films. They also jointly own certain copyright rights in multiple novels and other works.

In the original series, captain of the Enterprise James T. Kirk met former Starship captain Garth of Izar and the two of them discussed captain Garth’s victory in "the Battle of Axanar."  When Paramount and CBS recently learned of the development of an unauthorized production of a short film entitled Prelude to Azanar, they filed suit against its producers for copyright infringement, alleging the film incorporates numerous elements of their copyrighted works.

In an effort to fend off the lawsuit, the producers of Prelude to Azanar filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b)(6) is a procedural mechanism that allows a defendant being sued in Federal Court to seek an an order dismissing the case on the grounds that the complaint is legally insufficient and that, as a matter of law, it fails to state legal grounds justifying relief the court can grant.  Under the U.S. Constitution, Federal Courts have limited jurisdiction, and their authority does not extend to every dispute. Where a case fails to state a legal claim it will be dismissed. It is a potentially cost- and time-saving tool that allows for the early resolution of a case. If successful, the defendant can avoid incurring significant legal fees that otherwise would be necessitated by taking and responding to discovery and preparing for trial. 

In ruling on the motion, courts generally will not consider anything but the applicable law and the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, that is the point. Before the parties have to go through the expensive exercise of attempting to discover potentially relevant evidence, argue about and ask a fact finder to evaluate and determine disputed facts, the Court may first evaluate whether a complaint states a legal claim, assuming the alleged facts to be true.  If it does not, the case will be concluded at an early stage.

In the Prelude to Azanar action, the producers of the short film filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for copyright infringement. They asserted that the complaint failed to give them sufficient notice of the copyrighted works they were accused of infringing and that certain elements were not protectable under the copyright laws in any event, such as characters, species, costumes, makeup, weapons, and starships. They also raised issues concerning whether Paramount had standing to sue, and various other arguments, including that the lawsuit constituted an unlawful prior restraint under the First Amendment. However, the Court rejected every argument and found the complaint sufficiently alleged viable claims for copyright infringement. 

The defense system did not succeed and the producers of Prelude to Azanar were unable to ward off the studios' attack, at least not yet.  But this was not a ruling on the merits and the case is far from over.  Instead, the battle will continue.  Discovery will proceed and the facts and evidence will be developed as the case progresses.  Who will prevail on the ultimate issues remains to be seen.  As Judge Klausner put it, "whether Plaintiff's Claims will proper" is an issue for another day. But at least for the moment, "Plaintiff's claims will live long enough to survive Defendants' Motion to Dismiss."

Watch this space for further developments.  The case is Paramount Pictures Corp. & CBS Studios Inc. v. Axanar Productions, Inc. & Alec Peters, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Case No. CV 15-09938 RGK.

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Abridge Too Far: Ninth Circuit Upholds City Billboard Ordinance But Strikes Down Yellow Pages Regulation on First Amendment Grounds

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has issued a pair of First Amendment decisions that have implications for how and when cities can regulate commercial speech.  However, in one decision the Court failed to articulate the traditional First Amendment standards or explain how it evaluated the speech regulations under them. 

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press…." In the free speech context, courts analyzing regulations of speech according to a spectrum of values. For example, the closer to the core of First Amendment protection speech is, the greater protection it is afforded.

To that end, courts have developed the concept of "commercial speech."  The core notion of commercial speech is that it "does no more than propose a commercial transaction." While it is afforded a limited measure of First Amendment protection, that protection is less than the protection afforded, for example, to political speech. Courts evaluate content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech under the standard of "strict scrutiny," but analyze similar restrictions on commercial speech under a more lenient level of "intermediate  scrutiny."
 
Under the strict scrutiny test, a regulation is valid only if it is the least restrictive means available to further a compelling government interest. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a restriction on speech may be upheld if the speech concerns lawful activity that is not misleading; the restriction serves a substantial governmental interest, and the restriction is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Finally, When commercial speech and fully protected speech are “inextricably intertwined," courts do not apply different levels of scrutiny because to do so would be "artificial and impractical." Courts therefore are required to treat the entire intertwined speech as fully protected expression. On the other hand, speech that has both with commercial and noncommercial components that are not inextricably intertwined is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.

In its recent rulings, the Ninth Circuit rulings attempted to clarify the line between commercial and non-commercial speech where cities sought to regulate billboards and telephone directories.  But they were inconsistent in their approaches and in one decision did not even articulate how the ordinance should be evaluated under the appropriate level of scrutiny.

The City of Los Angeles' Speech Regulation

In Charles v. City of Los Angeles (Ninth Circuit Case No. 10-57028), the court addressed the city of Los Angeles' regulation of billboards. The city enacted an ordinance requiring a building permit for all temporary signs other than those containing “a political, ideological or other noncommercial message.” Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) § 14.4.16(A).

Wayne Charles (Charles) and Fort Self Storage (Fort) sought to install a temporary sign advertising a television program without obtaining the required city permits. They agreed that Fort would lease exterior wall space to Charles for the display of temporary signs bearing “content related to motion pictures, theatrical productions, television and radio programming, music, books, newspapers, paintings, and other works of art.” For its first sign, Charles proposed an image containing the “E! News” television program logo and photographs of the show's hosts, Giuliana Rancic and Ryan Seacrest.

Charles and Fort asserted that their advertisements were exempt from the ordinance’s permit requirement, asserting the sign contained a noncommercial message. The city disagreed and deemed the sign “strictly commercial in nature” and advised that installation of the proposed sign would violate several provisions of the sign ordinance. Charles and Fort filed suit, claiming the city violated their First Amendment rights in classifying their proposed signs as commercial speech, and seeking a declaration that signs of this nature are exempt from the permit requirement.

The city moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the sign constituted commercial speech and the city could regulate it. The district court agreed and entered judgment in favor of the city. The court rejected the argument that the proposed sign enjoyed the same First Amendment protection for noncommercial expression as the advertised news program itself and found the city was entitled to deference in deciding how to categorize such messages. Otherwise, courts would become the "first-line arbiters" of hundreds of thousands of billboards around the nation.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court's ruling. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court as to the level of deference that should be afforded city officials because of the essential role the judiciary plays in safeguarding First Amendment guarantees. While deference may be due for a city’s legislative decisions addressing the spread of billboard advertising, which require balancing the interests of traffic safety, revenue and aesthetics, no such deference is due as to city officials’ evaluations as to whether particular speech is commercial speech. Although officials have the authority to make such determinations, district courts reviewing such determinations should not merely defer to the city on such constitutional issues.

The concern that Federal courts might become the first-line arbiters of billboards to be erected across the country was deemed insufficient; in order to preserve "the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution," the Ninth Circuit explained that courts must engage in a de novo review of the city's determination that particular speech is not entitled to full First Amendment protection

The Ninth Circuit itself reviewed the city's conduct under this standard and determined that the advertisements constituted commercial speech and properly were governed by the sign ordinance. Accordingly, it affirmed the district court's judgment. Notably, the court did not articulate a traditional First Amendment analysis and did not explain how the regulations satisfied the requisite level of scrutiny. This is particularly odd, given that in the City of Seattle case, issued the same day, the court did just that.

The City of Seattle's' Speech Regulation

In Dex v. City of Seattle (Ninth Circuit Case No. 11-35399) the Ninth Circuit considered the Seattle's regulation of the distribution of "yellow page" phone directories. Seattle adopted an ordinance requiring yellow pages directory publishers to obtain permits and pay a fee for each directory distributed within the city. It also establishes an opt-out registry to allow residents to decline to receive them and required publishers to advertise the availability of the opt-out registry on the front cover of the directories. Two yellow page companies challenged the ordinance primarily on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment. The district court disagreed and upheld the regulations, granting summary judgment in favor of the city.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the phone books contained components of both commercial speech and noncommercial speech, thus requiring consideration of “the nature of the speech taken as a whole” in determining which level of First Amendment protection the yellow pages directories should receive. In that context, courts must inquire as to whether the particular speech “does no more than propose a commercial transaction,” taking into account the format, whether there is a reference to a specific product, and the underlying economic motive of the speaker.

In this case, yellow page phone directories historically were not created to serve merely as a vehicle for the delivery of ads. Rather, they started out as directories of telephone numbers. The commercial elements were added later and today still take up only a limited fraction of the space in the phone book. While publishers depend economically on advertisements to pay for the directories, that was not sufficient to distinguish them from other forms of communications that qualify for full First Amendment protection. Further, affording the directories less protection because commercial content is published alongside noncommercial content would require the court to draw a distinction between the directories and other publications that combine commercial and noncommercial speech, such as newspapers and magazines.

The Ninth Circuit held the directories were entitled to full First Amendment protection and did not withstand the strict scrutiny test. The court therefore remanded the case and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the publishers.

The outcome of these cases was hardly surprising.  However, in the City of Los Angeles case, while the Ninth Circuit did note its essential role in safeguarding the First Amendment’s guarantees and prohibiting undue deference to public officials in protecting them, it is troubling that the Ninth Circuit upheld the speech restriction without bothering to explain how the ordinance satisfied the appropriate level of scrutiny.

Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Law Firm Finds Its Head On A Plate: Franklin Mint Wins Malicious Prosecution Appeal in Trademark Dilution and False Advertising Case

On May 3, a California appellate court issued an 50 page decision in favor of the Franklin Mint Co. (Franklin Mint) in its appeal of a trial court's judgment that had dismissed its claim for malicious prosecution. The court found that no reasonable attorney could have found the false advertising claim tenable as it was alleged and litigated in an underlying case, and that no reasonable attorney could have concluded that the trademark claim could satisfy two fundamental, long-standing principles of trademark law. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for trial on malice and damages issues.

The case involved Franklin Mint's lawsuit against the law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP and one of its attorneys (Manatt), which had previously filed suit on behalf of Princess Diana's estate, and a related entity, in an attempt to enjoin Franklin Mint's use of the late Princess of Wales' name and likeness on commemorative memorabilia.

The Underlying Lawsuit
The underlying suit was commenced in federal district court in 1998, against Franklin Mint and others on behalf of the executors of the estate of Diana, Princess of Wales and the trustees of The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund (Fund). That complaint alleged causes of action for infringement of the California statutory right of publicity; trademark dilution, false designation of origin and false advertising under the Lanham Act; and unfair competition and false and misleading advertising under California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500.

Franklin Mint moved to dismiss each of the claims, and moved to strike inflammatory language referring to Franklin Mint as “vultures feeding on the dead.” The district court granted the as to the right of publicity claim on the ground that the law of Great Britain applied, and does not recognize a right of publicity. It also granted the motion to strike the inflammatory language. The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Franklin Mint on the trademark dilution and false advertising claims.

The Court explained that a finding of secondary meaning in this case would mean that the words "Diana, Princess of Wales" had acquired secondary meaning, a necessary element to prove trademark dilution. The court observed that to prove such a contention, the Fund would need to prove that the words "Diana, Princess of Wales" no longer primarily identify the individual, Princess Diana, but instead identify the Fund’s charitable activities. The court characterized such a suggestion as "absurd" and explained that, "[a]lthough Princess Diana is certainly well-recognized for her humanitarian work and fund-raising, she is undisputably also well-recognized for her status as a member of the royal family, her role as a mother, and her image as a fashionable princess." Thus, the court awarded Franklin Mint $1,635,000 in attorneys' fees for having to defend the trademark dilution and false advertising claims, which the court found to be groundless and unreasonable. The Fund appealed from the denial of its motion to reinstate the right of publicity claim, the summary adjudication of the false endorsement claim, and the award of attorney fees, but in June 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all three orders.

Franklin Mint's Malicious Prosecution Lawsuit
In 2002, Franklin Mint filed its own complaint against Manatt in the Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging a single cause of action for malicious prosecution of the trademark dilution and false advertising claims based on the allegation that Manatt lacked probable cause for bringing them. Manatt moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had probable cause for asserting both claims but its motion was denied. As to the trademark dilution claim, the court found that Manatt “failed to produce any evidence that Princess Diana’s name is inherently distinctive as opposed to descriptive of the person Princess Diana”; that “[t]he name Diana, Princess of Wales has not acquired a secondary meaning attributable to her charitable activities”; or that the items Manatt submitted to show “Princess Diana’s name being used in conjunction with certain charity events . . . do not mention any services she provided.” With respect to the false advertising claim, it found that Manatt “provided no evidence [Franklin Mint] had misled a substantial segment of its advertising audience regarding [Franklin Mint’s] donation of proceeds to charity. The evidence presented [in the underlying lawsuit], of which [Manatt was] aware, was that [Franklin Mint] had donated a portion of the more than $4 million in sales to one of Princess Diana’s favorite charities and had interpled the balance into district court. The evidence was uncontroverted then and remains so, even in this lawsuit.”

Following a 17 day jury trial and extensive argument, the trial court found that it was "overwhelmingly clear that [Manatt] had probable cause to bring [the] action and indeed confronted by a client seeking a remedy . . . and having consulted with other lawyers to determine whether or not that client’s cause had merit, had he failed to file a cause of action, one would have had a serious question of whether or not he committed malpractice.” The court thus entered judgment in favor of Manatt.

The Appeal
Franklin Mint appealed. On appeal the California Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that there was no probable cause to prosecute the trademark dilution or false advertising claims. As to the trademark dilution claims, the court found that there was no legally tenable argument that Princess Diana used the words "Diana, Princess of Wales" as a trademark, or that those words had acquired secondary meaning. It found that "no reasonable attorney would contend, especially in the immediate aftermath of her death, that the primary significance of 'Diana, Princess of Wales' was to identify the provider of charitable services rather than to identify Princess Diana herself" and thus there was no probable cause to allege those words had acquired secondary meaning.

The appellate court found that Manatt's argument, that it was not required to prove secondary meaning, ignored basic trademark law. The court pointed out that "the fundamental principles of trademark law – a trademark must identify a source of a product or service, and a descriptive mark such as a personal name, must acquire secondary meaning in the minds of the public – were clear and well established, and their application to this case is straightforward and uncomplicated. The complexity of the issues arises only from Manatt's attempts to avoid those fundamental principles." The court went on to find the false advertising claim was not tenable as alleged and prosecuted, reversed the judgment, and remanded it for trial on the issues of malice and damages.

The majority opinion was written by Judge Willhite, with Judge Suzukawa concurring. Judge Mosk dissented. The appellate court's opinion, Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Case No. B190482 (May 3, 2010), is available here.

Monday, April 26, 2010

Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Trade Secrets Case Where Statute of Limitations May Have Been Tolled

The Ninth Circuit has reversed the dismissal of a misappropriation of trade secrets case, finding that it would be premature to resolve the issue of whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations because a factual dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff's competitor concealed its misappropriation.

The court found that evidence from judicially noticeable court records existed that Plaintiff's competitor may have hidden any misappropriation by denying certain allegations at the relevant time. If that were the case, the Plaintiff would have been entitled to rely on the misrepresentations, which may have obscured the cause of action. Thus, the court concluded that it was premature to rule on the issue at the motion to dismiss stage because the plaintiff “may be able to prove a set of facts under which this action would be timely.”

The case is RA Medical Systems, Inc. v. Photomedix, Inc., Case No. No. 08-56477 (9th Cir. 2010).